Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia by Benjamin A. Olken
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
MONITORING CORRUPTION:








I wish to thank Alberto Alesina, Abhijit Banerjee, Robert Barro, Dan Biller, Stephen Burgess, Francesco
Caselli, Joe Doyle, Esther Duflo, Pieter Evers, Amy Finkelstein, Brian Jacob, Seema Jayachandran, Ben
Jones, Larry Katz, Philip Keefer, Michael Kremer, Jeff Liebman, Erzo Luttmer, Ted Miguel, Chris Pycroft,
Lant Pritchett, Mike Richards, Mark Rosenzweig, and numerous seminar participants for helpful comments.
Special thanks are due to Victor Bottini, Richard Gnagey, Susan Wong, and especially to Scott Guggenheim
for their support and assistance throughout the project. The field work and engineering survey would have
been impossible without the dedication of Faray Muhammad and Suroso Yoso Oetomo, as well as the entire
P4 field staff. This project was supported by a grant from the DfID-World Bank Strategic Poverty Partnership
Trust Fund. All views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of DfID,
the World Bank, or the National Bureau of Economic Research. Email: bolken@nber.org.
©2005 by Benajmin A. Olken.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
Benjamin A. Olken




This  paper  uses  a  randomized  field  experiment  to  examine  several  approaches  to  reducing
corruption. I measure missing expenditures in over 600 village road projects in Indonesia by having
engineers independently estimate the prices and quantities of all inputs used in each road, and then
comparing these estimates to villages' official expenditure reports. I find that announcing an
increased probability of a government audit, from a baseline of 4 percent to 100 percent, reduced
missing expenditures by about 8 percentage points, more than enough to make these audits cost-
effective. By contrast, I find that increasing grass-roots participation in the monitoring process only
reduced missing wages, with no effect on missing materials expenditures. Since materials account
for three-quarters of total expenditures, increasing grass-roots participation had little impact overall.
The findings suggest that grass-roots monitoring may be subject to free-rider problems. Overall, the
results  suggest  that  traditional  top-down  monitoring  can  play  an  important  role  in  reducing
corruption, even in a highly corrupt environment.
Benjamin A. Olken
Harvard Society of Fellows




1.  Introduction 
Corruption is a significant problem in much of the developing world. In many cases, 
corruption acts like a tax, adding to the cost of providing public services and conducting 
business. Often, though, the efficiency costs of corruption can be far worse.
1 Indeed, it has been 
suggested that corruption may be a major contributor to the low growth rates of many developing 
countries (Mauro 1995).  
Despite the importance of the problem, the inherent difficulty of directly measuring 
corrupt activity has meant that there is relatively little evidence, and therefore relatively little 
consensus, on how to best reduce corruption. One approach to reducing corruption, dating back 
at least to Becker and Stigler (1974), suggests that the right combination of monitoring and 
punishments can control corruption. In practice, however, the very individuals tasked with 
monitoring and enforcing punishments may themselves be corruptible. In that case, increasing 
the probability that a low-level official is monitored by a higher-level official could result only in 
a transfer between the officials, not in a reduction of corruption.
2 Whether one can actually 
control corruption by increasing top-down monitoring in such an environment is an open, and 
important, empirical question. 
  An alternative approach to reducing corruption, which has gained prominence in recent 
years, is to increase grass-roots participation by community members in local-level monitoring. 
Community participation is now regarded in much of the development community as the key not 
only to reduced corruption, but to improved public service delivery more generally. For example, 
the entire 2004 World Development Report is devoted to the idea of “putting poor people at the 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Krueger (1974) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) for examples of how the efficiency costs of 
corruption can substantially exceed the amount stolen itself. 
2 Cadot (1987), for example, discusses this possibility, and shows that this type of multi-tiered corruption can lead to 
multiple equilibria in corruption. 
  1center of service provision: enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers, 
amplifying their voice in policymaking, and strengthening the incentives for service providers to 
serve the poor.” (World Bank 2004) The idea behind the grass-roots approach is that community 
members are the people who benefit from a successful program, and so may have better 
incentives to monitor than disinterested central government bureaucrats (Stiglitz 2002). Of 
course, this approach has potential drawbacks as well – for example, monitoring public projects 
is a public good, so there may be a serious free rider problem. Grass-roots monitoring may also 
be prone to capture by local elites (Bardhan 2002, Bardhan and Mookherjee forthcoming). Given 
these countervailing forces, whether grass-roots monitoring can actually succeed in reducing 
corruption is also an empirical question.
3
To examine these alternative approaches to fighting corruption, I designed and conducted 
a randomized, controlled field experiment in 608 Indonesian villages. At the time the study 
started, each village in the study was about to start building a village road as part of a nationwide 
village-level infrastructure project. To examine the impact of external monitoring, I randomly 
selected some villages to be told, after funds had been awarded but before construction began, 
that their project would subsequently be audited by the central government audit agency. This 
amounted to increasing the probability of an external government audit in those villages from a 
baseline of about 4 percent to essentially 100 percent. Government audits carry with them the 
theoretical possibility of criminal action, though this is quite rare; more important, the results of 
the audits were read publicly to an open village meeting by the auditors, and so could result in 
substantial social sanctions. The audits were subsequently conducted as promised.  
                                                 
3 Several authors have found suggestive evidence in both micro and macro cross-sectional data that higher levels of 
“voice” are associated with lower levels of corruption. Rose-Ackerman (2004) provides a summary of much of the 
work on this topic to date.  
  2To investigate the impact of increasing community participation in the monitoring 
process, I designed two different experiments that sought to increase grass-roots monitoring in 
the project. Specifically, the experiments sought to enhance participation at “accountability 
meetings,” the village-level meetings where project officials account for how they spent project 
funds. In one experiment, hundreds of invitations to these meetings were distributed throughout 
the village, to encourage direct participation in the monitoring process and to reduce elite 
dominance of the process. In the second experiment, an anonymous comment form was 
distributed along with the invitations, providing villagers an opportunity to relay information 
about the project without fear of retaliation. This comment form was then collected before the 
accountability meetings in sealed drop-boxes, and the results were summarized at the meetings. 
Both of these experimental interventions were successful in raising grass-roots participation 
levels—the invitations increased the number of people participating in the accountability 
meetings by about 40 percent, and the comment forms generated hundreds of comments about 
the project, both good and bad, in each village.  
To evaluate the impact of these experiments on corruption, one needs a measure of 
corruption. Traditionally, much of the empirical work on corruption has been based on 
perceptions of corruption, rather than on direct measures of corruption.
4 This paper, however, 
builds on a small but growing literature that examines corruption by comparing two measures of 
the same quantity, one “before” and one “after” corruption has taken place.
5 To do this in the 
                                                 
4 The use of perceptions-based measures of corruption in economics was pioneered by Mauro (1995) and forms the 
basis of the much-cited Transparency International Corruption Index (Lambsdorff 2003). More recent work using 
perceptions-based measures is summarized in Rose-Ackerman (2004).   
5 For example, Reinikka and Svensson (2004) examine corruption in educational expenditures, Fisman and Wei 
(2004) and Yang (2004) examine corruption in international trade, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) examine 
corruption in hospital procurement, and Olken (forthcoming) examines theft from a government redistribution 
program. This paper differs slightly from much of this literature by comparing government reports to an 
independently constructed estimate, rather than comparing government reports to the reports of a different 
  3context of the road projects, I assembled a team of engineers and surveyors who, after the 
projects were completed, dug core samples in each road to estimate the quantity of materials 
used, surveyed local suppliers to estimate prices, and interviewed villagers to determine the 
wages paid on the project. From these data, I construct an independent estimate of the amount 
each project actually cost to build, and then compare this estimate with what the village reported 
it spent on the project on a line-item by line-item basis. The difference between what the village 
claimed the road cost to build, and what the engineers estimated it actually cost to build, is the 
key measure of missing expenditures I examine in this paper. Since the village must account for 
every Rupiah it received from the central government, stolen funds must show up somewhere in 
the difference between reported expenditures and estimated actual expenditures.
6
Using these data, I find that there were substantial reductions in missing expenditures 
associated with the audit experiment. In particular, I estimate that the audit treatment – i.e., 
increasing the probability of an audit from a baseline of 4 percent to 100 percent – was 
associated with reductions in missing expenditures of an average of 8 percentage points. These 
reductions came both from reductions in unaccounted-for materials procured for the project and 
in unaccounted-for labor expenditures. The audits were particularly effective in villages where 
the village head was up for reelection, and where the previous election results suggested that the 
upcoming election would be close, which suggests that external monitoring and democratic 
accountability may be complements, and more generally, that the interaction of the monitoring 
probability and the punishment level conditional on being caught is positive. Interestingly, I find 
                                                                                                                                                             
government agency or to a household survey. In that sense, it is related to Hsieh and Moretti (2005), who compare 
prices received by Iraq under the UN Oil-for-Food program to the world oil price. 
6 These ‘missing expenditures’, i.e., the difference between reported expenditures and my estimate of actual 
expenditures, may also include sources of losses other than pure theft. I discuss below how I constructed several test 
roads to estimate the typical amount of materials lost during construction, which I use to calibrate the missing 
expenditures measure to be 0 in a road where I know a priori that there was no corruption. I also discuss below how 
I use independent measures of the quality of road construction that are likely to be unrelated to corruption to 
differentiate between overall changes in the competence of road builders and corruption per se.  
  4that the number of project jobs given to family members of project officials actually increased in 
response to the audits, which provides suggestive evidence that alternative forms of corruption 
may be substitutes. I compare the costs and benefits from the audits and find that on net the 
audits were highly cost effective. 
By contrast, I find that the participation experiments – the invitations and the comment 
forms – were associated with much smaller, and statistically insignificant, reductions in overall 
missing expenditures. As discussed above, the interventions did raise community participation in 
the monitoring process. Moreover, villages in the invitations treatment were more likely to 
openly discuss corruption problems at the accountability meetings, and villages receiving both 
invitations and comment forms were more likely to take serious action at the meeting to resolve 
corruption-related problems. However, the magnitude of these changes in behavior at the 
meetings was small, and these treatments did not measurably reduce overall missing 
expenditures. 
The small overall effects of the participation experiments on overall missing 
expenditures, however, mask substantial differences across types of expenditures. In particular, 
the invitations treatment substantially reduced missing labor expenditures, but had no effect 
whatsoever on missing materials expenditures. Since materials account for about three-quarters 
of total expenditures, the average impact was nonetheless small and statistically insignificant.  
There are two potential explanations for why increasing grass-roots participation would 
have impacted labor expenditures but not materials – either community members had better 
information about labor expenditures than about materials, or community members had a greater 
incentive to monitor wage payments than materials payments (since they were the ones working 
on the project and would be the beneficiaries if wage payments had been stolen). In fact, the 
  5results suggest that villagers had less information about missing labor expenditures than about 
missing materials expenditure. Furthermore, the invitations treatment was most effective when 
the workers came from inside the village and participated in monitoring. Combined, this suggests 
that grass-roots monitoring may be most effective when a subset of people personally stand to 
gain from reducing corruption, and therefore have strong incentives to monitor actively. Grass-
roots monitoring may thus be subject to a free-rider problem.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the setting in 
which the study takes place. Section 3 describes the experimental interventions. Section 4 
describes the data used in the study. Section 5 presents the results of the experiments. Section 6 
performs a cost-benefit analysis. Section 7 concludes.  
2.  Setting 
The Kecamatan (Subdistrict) Development Project, or KDP, is a national government 
program, funded through a loan from the World Bank. KDP finances projects in approximately 
15,000 villages throughout Indonesia each year. The data in this paper come from KDP projects 
in 608 villages in two of Indonesia’s most populous provinces, East Java and Central Java, and 
were collected between September 2003 and August 2004.  
In KDP, participating subdistricts, which typically contain between 10 and 20 villages, 
receive an annual block grant for three consecutive years. Every year, each village in the 
subdistrict makes a proposal for any combination of small-scale infrastructure and seed capital 
for microcredit cooperatives. The majority of villages (72%) propose an infrastructure project, 
plus a small amount for savings-and-loans for women. An inter-village forum ranks all of 
proposals according to a number of criteria, such as number of beneficiaries and project cost, and 
projects are funded according to the rank list until all funds have been exhausted.  
  6If the project is funded, a meeting is held to plan construction, after which an elected 
implementation team procures materials, hires labor, and builds the project. The members of the 
implementation team receive an honorarium, limited in total to a maximum of 3 percent of the 
total cost of the project.
7 No contractors are used in construction. 
A typical funded village receives funds on the order of Rp. 80 million (US$8,800) for 
infrastructure; these funds are often supplemented by voluntary contributions from village 
residents, primarily in the form of unpaid labor. These projects are large relative to ordinary local 
government activities; in 2001, the average village budget was only Rp. 71 million (US$7,800), 
so receiving a KDP project more than doubles average local government expenditures. The 
allocation to the village is lump-sum, so that the village is the residual claimant. In particular, 
surplus funds can be used, with the approval of a village meeting, for additional development 
projects, rather than having to be returned to the KDP program.  
By far the most common type of infrastructure project proposed by villages is the 
surfacing of an existing dirt road with a surface made of sand, rocks, and gravel. These roads 
range in length from 0.5 – 3 km, and may either run within the village or run from the village to 
the fields. Dirt roads in Java are typically impassible during the rainy season; surfacing these 
roads allows them to be used year-round. To facilitate comparisons, the sample of villages 
considered in this paper is limited to villages with such non-asphalt road projects. 
The project includes several mechanisms to ensure proper use of project funds. The 
primary mechanism is a series of village-level accountability meetings. Funds are released to the 
implementation team in three tranches, of 40%, 40%, and 20% of the funds, respectively. In 
order to obtain the second and third tranches of funds, the implementation team is required to 
                                                 
7 In the data, the total honorarium payments to each member of the implementation team averaged Rp. 460,000, or 
approximately Rp. 150,000 ($17) per month of the construction. By comparison, median per-capita monthly 
expenditure in comparable areas in East and Central Java in 2003 was about Rp 140,000 ($15). 
  7present an accountability report to an open village meeting, explaining how all funds were used. 
Only after that meeting has approved the accountability report is the next tranche of funds 
released. Similarly, in order to participate in the subsequent year of KDP, villages are required to 
present a final, cumulative accountability report at the end of the project, which similarly must 
be approved by a village meeting. Though open to the entire village, these meetings are typically 
attended by only 30-50 people, most of whom are members of the village elite, out of a total 
adult population of about 2,500. 
In addition, subdistrict, district and provincial level project managers, engineers, and 
facilitators conduct overall supervision of all projects, and there is a provincial complaints-
handling unit which investigates allegations of improprieties. Furthermore, each year, the project 
is audited by the independent government development audit agency, Badan Pengawasan 
Keuangan dan Pembangunan (BPKP). Each village-level project in the study area has about a 
4% baseline chance of being audited by BPKP. Auditors come to the village, cross-check all of 
the financial records looking for irregularities, and inspect the physical infrastructure. Findings 
from the audits are sent to project officials for follow-up, and can potentially lead to criminal 
action, though prosecutions for village-level officials are rare in practice (Woodhouse 2004). 
More often, officials found to have stolen money are forced to publicly return the money, which 
can result in substantial social sanctions. 
Corruption at the village level can occur in several ways.
8 First, implementation teams, 
potentially working with the village head, may collude with suppliers. Suppliers can inflate 
either the prices or the quantities listed on the official receipts to generate money for a kick-back 
to village and project officials. Second, members of the implementation team may manipulate 
                                                 
8 Of course, there may also be collusion or kickbacks at the national or district level of the program. This paper, 
however, focuses on corruption where the bulk of the program money is actually spent—at the village level. 
  8wage payments. As discussed above, villagers in Indonesia typically contribute unpaid or 
reduced-wage labor to public works projects; corrupt officials can bill the project for labor 
anyway and pocket the difference. In other cases, those running the project can simply inflate the 
number of workers paid by the project. All of these types of corruption will be investigated in the 
empirical work below. 
3.  Experimental Design 
 
The experiments discussed in this paper examine different ways of altering the 
probability that corruption is detected and punishments are enforced. Three interventions are 
examined – increasing the probability of external audits (“Audits”), increasing participation in 
accountability meetings (“Invitations”), and providing an anonymous comment form to villages 
(“Invitations + Comments”). Section 3.1 discusses the overall experimental design. Section 3.2 
then discusses the Audit interventions, and Section 3.3 describes the Invitations and Comment 
interventions. Section 3.4 discusses the timing of the interventions and data collection. 
3.1.  Experimental Design 
Table 1 displays the basic experimental design. As shown in Table 1, randomization into 
the Invitations and Comment Form treatments was independent of randomization into the Audit 
treatment. In both cases, the treatments were announced to villages after the project design and 
allocations to each village had been finalized, but before construction or procurement of 
materials began.
9 Thus, the choice of what type of project to build, as well as the project’s design 
and planned budget, should all be viewed as exogenous with respect to the experiments.  
                                                 
9 In all villages (including control villages), at the village meeting immediately after the final allocations were 
announced but before construction began, the study enumerator made a short (less than 5 minute) presentation, 
introducing him or herself and explaining that there would be a study in the village, that each village and project 
official would be interviewed for data collection, and that the enumerator would be present to record what happened 
at each of the accountability meetings. In villages receiving a treatment, the only difference was that this 
introduction was followed by a description of the treatment(s) in that village. The final engineering survey was not 
  9The randomization of Audits and Invitations/Comment treatments differed in several 
ways. First, there was a concern that the audit treatment might be likely to spillover from one 
village to another, as officials in other villages might worry that when the auditors came to the 
subdistrict, their villages might be audited as well.
10 On the other hand, the participation 
treatments were much less likely to have similar spillover effects, as the treatment was directly 
observable in the different villages early on. Therefore, the randomization for Audits was 
clustered by subdistrict (i.e., either all study villages in a subdistrict received Audits or none did), 
while the randomization for Invitations and Comment Forms was done village-by-village. The 
calculations of the standard errors below are adjusted to take into account the potential 
correlation of outcomes in villages within a subdistrict. 
This difference in clustering also necessitated a difference in stratification. As the 
Invitations and Comment Forms were randomized village-by-village, they were stratified by 
subdistrict, the lowest administrative level above the village. Since the Audits were randomized 
by subdistrict, they needed to be stratified at a higher level. Therefore, the Audits were stratified 
by district and by the number of years the subdistrict had participated in the KDP program. This 
yielded a total of 156 strata for the Invitations / Comment Forms, each containing an average of 
3.8 study villages, and 50 strata for the Audits, each containing an average of 3.1 study 
subdistricts and 12.1 study villages.  
In the analysis, I report three specifications – no fixed effects, fixed effects for each 
engineering team that conducted the survey, and stratum fixed effects. Despite the stratification, 
the randomization was designed so that the probability each village received a given treatment 
                                                                                                                                                             
mentioned at all to the villagers during this presentation, or subsequently, until the surveyors actually appeared to 
conduct the survey. 
10 This was most likely to be a problem within subdistricts, as there is frequent communication between both village 
officials and project officials within a subdistrict. Communication across subdistrict lines is much more limited, 
particularly for village officials. 
  10was always held constant, regardless of what stratum the village was in. The probability of 
receiving a given treatment is therefore orthogonal to any stratum or village-level variable, so 
including stratum fixed effects, while it may reduce standard errors, is not necessary for the 
analysis to be consistent.   
 Although locations of treatments were randomized by computer according to the 
procedures described above, it is useful to examine whether, ex-post, they are correlated with 
village characteristics of interest. I therefore examined the relationship between the treatment 
variables and ten village characteristics that might be correlated with the outcome variables of 
interest.
11 As expected given the randomization, these variables are not jointly significant 
predictors of the treatments. Moreover, including these variables as controls does not affect the 
results of the experiment presented below. 
3.2.  The Audit Experiment 
In the “Audit” treatment, villages were told, at the village meeting where they began 
planning for actual construction, that their project would be audited by BPKP, the government 
audit agency, with probability 1. They were told that the audit could take place either during or 
after construction was finished, and would include inspections of both the project’s financial 
records as well as a field-inspection of the construction activities. Approximately two months 
later, the village implementation team received a one-page letter from BPKP which confirmed 
that the village had been chosen to be audited and which spelled out in somewhat greater detail 
exactly what would be covered by the audit.  
                                                 
11 The variables examined are the variables used in analysis of pilot data, and were specified before any of the data 
used here was collected. The variables include the following: village population, percent of households in the village 
classified as poor, number of mosques per thousand people, the total budget for the project, the number of sub-
projects included, distance from the village to the subdistrict, the village head’s age, education, and salary (in 
hectares of land), and whether the community is mountainous. While several of these variables (village head age, 
salary, and whether the community is mountainous) are correlated with the audit treatment at the 10% level, the 10 
variables considered are not jointly significant. 
  11Villages were told that results of the audits, in addition to being reported to the central 
government and project officials, would also be delivered directly by the auditors to a special 
village meeting. Village officials therefore faced several potential sanctions from the audits – 
retribution from the village, the possibility that the village would not receive KDP projects in the 
future, and the theoretical possibility of criminal action.  
Between one and four months after construction had started, Phase I of the audits 
commenced.
12 The main purpose of this first round of audits was to credibly demonstrate that the 
audits were real, rather than an idle threat. One village in each subdistrict receiving the Audit 
treatment was randomly selected to be audited during this first phase. The audit was conducted 
over two days, and the results were subsequently presented by the auditors to a specially called 
public village meeting, where members of the implementation team and village officials were 
given an opportunity to propose corrective actions for the auditors’ findings.  
After the first round of audits, all study villages receiving the audit treatment, including 
the village that was audited during Phase I, were informed in another letter from BPKP that they 
would be audited again after the construction on the project had been completed. The second 
phase of the audits was conducted approximately seven months subsequently, after both 
construction was finished and the collection of the corruption data described below was 
completed. As with Phase I audits, the results from the Phase II audits were presented to the 
village in an open village meeting and forwarded to the project for followup. 
                                                 
12 All audits in this phase took place during a three week period during mid January / early February 2004. However, 
since there was heterogeneity in the timing of when construction started, this was anywhere between 1 and 4 months 
after construction had begun. 
  123.3.  The Participation Experiments 
In the “Invitations” treatment, either 300 or 500 invitations were distributed throughout 
the village several days prior to each of the three accountability meetings.
13 Though village 
meetings are officially open to the public, in practice Javanese villagers consider it quite rude to 
attend a meeting to which they have not been formally invited (usually in writing), and with the 
exception of a few independent-minded members of the village elite, they rarely do. The village 
head, who normally issues written invitations for the meetings, therefore has the potential to 
stack the attendance of the accountability meeting in his favor by issuing invitations only to his 
supporters. By distributing a large number of invitations, the village head’s ability to control who 
attends the meeting was substantially reduced.  
Given the size of a typical village, approximately one in every two households in 
treatment villages received an invitation. The invitations were distributed either by sending them 
home with school children, or by asking the heads of hamlets and neighborhood associations to 
distribute them throughout their areas of the village. The number of invitations (300 or 500) and 
the method of distributing them (schools or neighborhood associations) was randomized by 
village.
14
In the “Invitations + Comment Forms” treatment, invitations were distributed exactly as 
in the Invitations treatment, but attached to the invitation was a comment form asking villagers’ 
opinions of the project. The idea behind the comment form was that villagers might be afraid of 
retaliation from village elites, and thus providing an anonymous comment form would increase 
detection of corruption. The form asked the recipient to answer several questions about the road 
                                                 
13 In addition, for each meeting a small subsidy – Rp. 45,000 ($5) for villages with 300 invitations, Rp. 75,000 ($8) 
for villages with 500 invitations – was given to the implementation team to cover the additional cost of providing 
snacks to the extra attendees induced by the invitations. 
14 The purpose of these extra randomizations – the number of invitations and how they were distributed – was to 
generate additional variation in the number and composition of meeting attendees, to distinguish size effects from 
composition effects. However, these sub-treatments did not generate a strong enough first-stage to be used in the 
analysis.  
  13project, and then to return the form – either filled out or blank – to a sealed drop box, placed 
either at a village school or at a store in the sub-village. The instructions stated clearly that the 
recipients should not write their name on the form, in order to preserve their anonymity. The 
form had four closed-response questions (i.e., requesting answers of the form Good, Satisfactory, 
or Poor) about various aspects of the project, and two free-response questions, one about the job 
performance of the implementation team and one about any other project-related issues. The 
comment forms were collected from the drop boxes two days before each meeting and 
summarized by a project enumerator. The enumerator then read the summary, including a 
representative sample of the open-response questions, at the village meeting.  
3.4.  Timing 
The experiment began in September 2003. After the inter-village forum described in 
Section 2 made the final allocations of funds, the enumerator went to the village planning 
meeting that immediately followed and, at that planning meeting, announced any interventions 
(audits or participation) that would take place in that village. Construction began shortly 
thereafter, between October and November 2003. Those villages receiving audits received the 
first letter from BPKP in November 2003, and the first round of audits took place in one 
randomly selected village in each subdistrict in January 2004, while construction was in 
progress. The second letter from BPKP was sent out to villages shortly thereafter. The 
accountability meetings at which the participation interventions were conducted took place after 
40%, 80%, and 100% of the funds were spent, between October 2003 and May 2004. The 
engineering survey to measure missing expenditures took place after construction was finished, 
between May and August 2004. The final round of audits was conducted in all villages in the 
audit treatment in September 2004 after all of the data used in this paper had been completed.  
  144.  Data 
 
The data used in this paper come from four types of surveys, each designed by the author 
and conducted specifically as part of the project: a key-informant survey, covering baseline 
characteristics about the village and the village implementation team; a meeting survey, 
containing data on the attendees and a first-hand report of discussions at the accountability 
meetings; a household survey, containing data on household participation in and perceptions of 
the project; and a final field survey, used to measure corruption in the project. This measurement 
was conducted in all villages (both treatment and control), and is completely separate from the 
audits conducted by BPKP as part of the “Audit” treatment. This section describes the final field 
survey used to measure unaccounted-for expenditures in the road projects; the remaining data, as 
well as additional details on the field survey, are discussed in more detail in Appendix A. 
4.1.  Reported Expenditures 
The key dependent variable I examine is the difference between what villages claim they 
spent on the project and an independent estimate of what villages actually spent. Obtaining data 
on what villages claim they spent is relatively straightforward. At the end of the project, all 
village implementation teams are required to file an accountability report with the project 
subdistrict office, in which they report the prices, quantities, and total expenditure on each type 
of material and each type of labor (skilled, unskilled, and foreman) used in the project. The total 
amount reported must match the total amount allocated to the village. In addition, they also 
report, for each type of material and labor, the amount donated to the project by villagers. These 
financial reports were readily available to the survey team for all study villages. 
Obtaining an independent estimate of what was actually spent is substantially more 
difficult, and involves three main activities—an engineering survey to determine quantities of 
  15materials used, a worker survey to determine wages paid by the project, and a supplier survey to 
determine prices for materials.  
4.2.  Measuring Quantities of Materials 
In the engineering survey, an engineer and an assistant conducted a detailed physical 
assessment of all physical infrastructure built by the project in order to obtain an estimate of the 
quantity of materials used. In the standard road design, known as a Telford road, the road 
consists of three types of materials—a base of sand, a layer of large (10-15 cm) rocks, and a top 
layer of gravel to provide a smooth running surface.
15 To estimate the quantity of each of these 
materials, the engineers dug ten 40cm × 40cm core samples at randomly selected locations on the 
road. By combining the measurements of the volume of each material per square meter of road 
with measurements of the total length and average width of the road, I can estimate the total 
quantity of materials used in the road. 
It is important to note, however, that this estimate of the materials used in the road, while 
it should be proportional to the total quantity of materials used in the road, may be smaller in 
magnitude than the actual amount of materials used in the road, as some amount of loss is normal 
during construction and measurement. For example, some amount of sand may blow away off 
the top of a truck, or may not be totally scooped out of the hole dug by the engineers conducting 
the core sample. I denote the average percentage of materials lost due to normal construction 
processes and measurement error but with no corruption as the loss ratio.  
To deal with these loss ratios, whenever possible I express the measured quantities in log 
form, so that the average loss ratio will be captured by the constant term and will not affect 
                                                 
15 Three other similar road designs are also included in the study. Telasah roads are similar to Telford, but install the 
rocks flatside-up to create a smooth running surface, and therefore largely omit the gravel layer. Sirtu roads consist 
of gravel only, omitting the sand and rock layer. Katel roads are similar in design to Telford, but use a mixture of 
clay and gravel in the top layer to create a more permanent top surface. Telford roads, however, account for 86 
percent of the road projects in the sample. The type of road is chosen before the randomization is announced. 
  16estimated differences across villages. However, in some cases, such as when combining different 
types of materials into the aggregate percent missing measure, this approach is not sufficient, and 
one actually needs to estimate these loss ratios. One also needs an estimate of these loss ratios if 
one is interested in the level of the percent missing variable, not just the differences across 
villages. 
To obtain such an estimate, I constructed four short (60m) “test roads” in different areas 
of East and Central Java as a calibration exercise. During the construction of each of these roads, 
the survey team carefully measured all quantities before construction (i.e., while still in the 
delivery trucks). After construction was completed, the techniques described above were used 
several times, by different engineers, to estimate the quantity of materials used in the road. To 
allow time for materials to settle and to account for the effects of weather, these followup 
measurements were conducted anywhere from 1 week to 1 year after the test road was 
completed. The ratio between the amount of materials actually used in the road and the amount 
measured after the road was built is an estimate of the loss ratio. I describe this calibration 
exercise and the resulting loss ratios in more detail in Appendix B. 
While the road project comprises the main use of KDP funds in each village, roads are 
often accompanied by smaller ancillary projects, such as culverts, retaining walls, and gabions, 
and occasionally by larger projects, such as a small bridge. For each of the ancillary projects, the 
engineer on the survey team conducted a detailed field survey, measuring and sketching each 
constructed piece of infrastructure to estimate the volume of materials, such as cement, rocks, 
and sand, used in the construction. 
4.3.  Measuring Wages and Hours Worked 
Workers, defined as people who worked on the project for pay, were asked which of the 
many activities involved in building the road were done with paid labor, voluntary labor, or some 
  17combination, what the daily wage and number of hours worked was, and to describe any piece 
rate arrangements that may have been part of the building of the project. To estimate the quantity 
of person-days actually paid out by the project, I combine information from the worker survey 
about the percentage of each task done with paid labor, information from the engineering survey 
about the quantity of each task, and assumptions of worker capacity derived both from the 
experience of field engineers and the experience from building the test roads. These assumptions 
of worker capacity are discussed in more detail in Appendix B. 
4.4.  Measuring Prices 
Since there is substantial variation in the prices of construction materials across 
subdistricts, a price survey was conducted in each subdistrict. Since there can be substantial 
differences in transportation costs within a subdistrict, surveyors obtained prices for each 
material that included transportation costs to each survey village. The price survey included 
several types of suppliers—supply contractors, construction supply stores, truck drivers (who 
typically transport the materials used in the project), and workers at quarries—as well recent 
buyers of material (primarily workers at construction sites).
16 For each type of material used by 
the project, between three and five independent prices were obtained; I use the median price 
from the survey for the analysis.  
4.5.  Measures of missing expenditures 
From the data on the financial reports, I can calculate the expenditures from the financial 
reports, which I hereafter will refer to as reported amount, and the expenditures estimated from 
the field survey, which I will refer to as the actual amount. I define the percent missing to be the 
                                                 
16 Furthermore, to reduce the potential for bias induced by surveying the actual suppliers for the project, who may be 
in collusion with project officials, only survey responses from sources outside a given village are used to construct 
the prices for that village, and no mention of KDP was made until the end of the interview. It turns out that 27% of 
those interviewed for the price survey had actually been suppliers to the KDP program; dropping them from the 
analysis, however, does not affect the results. In fact, restricting the price data to only prices obtained from buyers of 
materials (i.e., dropping all suppliers of materials from the price survey) also does not affect the results.   
  18difference between the log of the reported amount and the log of the actual amount. This 
variable—the percent missing—is the main measure used in the subsequent analysis. 
I use several different versions of the percent missing measure in the empirical analysis. 
First, I report the percent missing for the four major items—sand, rocks, gravel, and unskilled 
labor—used in the road project. As shown in Table 2, expenditures on these four items account 
for 90% of reported expenditures on the road project. As these are the four major sources of 
expenditure, substantial effort was put into ensuring that these four items were measured as 
accurately as possible in the engineering survey.  
As shown in Table 2, the road project accounts for 77% of total funds spent; a further 
15% of funds are spent on ancillary projects that go along with the road, such as culverts and 
retaining walls. Each of these projects was inspected by the field engineers, generating an 
estimate of the amount of sand, rock, cement, and labor used in each. The second measure of 
missing expenditures, major items in the main road + ancillary projects, adds in these 
expenditures as well.
17 Finally, I report the percent missing separately for materials and unskilled 
labor in the road project. 
5.  Experimental Results 
5.1.  Estimating Equation 
Given the randomized nature of the experiments, estimating their effects is 
straightforward. I estimate an equation of the following form via OLS: 
PERCENTMISSINGijk = α1 + α2 AUDITjk + α3 INVITATIONSijk +  
α4 INVITATIONSANDCOMMENTSijk +εijk  (1) 
                                                 
17 The number of observations is higher when these ancillary expenditures are included because, for some villages, 
reported expenditures for the main road were combined with those from the ancillary projects. For those villages, the 
corruption measure could not be constructed for just the main road, but it could be computed for the main road + 
ancillary projects. 
  19where i represents a village, j represents a subdistrict, and k represents a stratum for the audits. 
Since the AUDIT treatment variable is perfectly correlated within subdistricts, the standard 
errors are adjusted to allow for correlation within subdistricts. As each of the 12 engineering 
teams may have conducted the corruption measurements slightly differently, I estimate a version 
of equation (1) that includes engineering team fixed effects. Finally, when investigating the 
audits, I estimate a version of equation (1) that includes fixed effects for each audit stratum k, 
and when investigating the invitations and comment forms, I estimate a version of equation (1) 
that includes fixed-effects for each subdistrict j (i.e., the stratifying variable for the participation 
experiments).
18
5.2.  The Audit Experiment 
5.2.1.  Overall Effects 
Table 3 presents the main results from the audit experiment. Each row presents the 
percent missing in different aspects of the project. The first column presents the mean percent 
missing in the control villages – i.e., those villages that did not receive the audits – and the 
second column presents the mean level in the villages that received the audits. The effect of the 
audits – i.e., the coefficient α2 in equation (1) – is presented in column (3). The p-value from a 
test that the audit effect is zero is presented in column (4). Columns (5) and (6) again present the 
audit effect and p-values allowing for engineer fixed effects, and columns (7) and (8) present the 
results allowing for stratum fixed effects. 
                                                 
18 Note that approximately 12% of the observations in the sample were dropped, because the reported expenditure 
could not be accurately matched to the data from the engineering survey. This was caused by one of four reasons: 
(1) surveyor error in locating the road, (2) the project consisted largely of a partial rehabilitation of an existing road, 
(3) agglomerated expenditures reports (i.e., the village expenditure report combined expenditures in the road project 
with other projects that could not be independently measured, such as a school), or (4) villages that had asphalted the 
road that refused to let the engineers break the asphalt to conduct the engineering survey. The probability of an 
observation being dropped for any one of these reasons appears empirically to be unrelated to any of the treatments. 
  20The results show that the audits had a substantial, and statistically significant, negative 
effect on the percentage of expenditures that could not be accounted for. Column (3) shows that 
the audits reduced the percent missing in the road project by 8.5 percentage points, and the 
percent missing in the road and ancillary projects by 9.1 percentage points. These effects are 
statistically significant, with p-values of 0.058 and 0.034, respectively. Looking across the other 
columns, these effects are generally of similar magnitude and statistical significance with 
engineer or stratum fixed effects. The only exception is when stratum fixed effects are included 
on the road expenditures variable (Coulmn 7, row 1), in which case the estimated effect of the 
audits is only a 4.8 percentage point reduction.
19 Looking across all of the specifications shown, 
I conclude that the audits reduced missing expenditures by an average of about 8 percentage 
points. Compared with the baseline level of about 28 percentage points in control villages, the 
point estimates imply a reduction in missing expenditures of about 30 percent of the baseline 
level, although, as discussed above, the absolute levels of the percent-missing variable depend on 
assumptions for loss ratios and should be interpreted with caution.  
Breaking down the change in corruption into materials and labor, Table 3 shows 
substantial reductions in both materials (sand, rocks and gravel) and unskilled labor associated 
with the audits, though these separate effects are not statistically significant.
20 Interestingly, in 
results not reported in the table, I find no significant differences in the effect of the audits 
                                                 
19 The reason that the results are different when stratum fixed effects are included is that doing so effectively 
removes 13 strata from the sample. The audit randomization was conducted before the list of villages with road 
projects was known (though the randomization results were kept strictly secret). Out of the initial 166 subdistricts 
included in the randomization, only 156 subdistricts ended up having villages with road projects. This, plus dropping 
observations for the reasons described in footnotes 17 and 18, led to 13 out of 50 strata with either all audit or all 
non-audit villages that are effectively dropped by stratum fixed effects. Estimating the overall results dropping these 
13 strata, but without any fixed effects, yields results similar to stratum fixed effects results. This problem is less 
severe for the major items in roads and ancillary projects, in part because fewer observations are missing and thus 
fewer strata are effectively dropped. 
20 It is worth noting that, due to the log transformation, mechanically the change in log (materials + wages) and 
log(materials) + log(wages) will not be identical. 
  21between those villages audited both during and after construction and those villages audited only 
after construction was finished (and, therefore, after the engineering survey was completed). This 
suggests that the reduction in missing expenditures was caused by the threat of an audit, rather 
than corrective actions imposed by the auditors once they arrived.  
Mechanically, unaccounted-for funds must be accounted for by differences in either the 
price charged per unit or in differences in the quantities used. When the goods being procured 
are commodities (as they are in this case), it is much easier for monitors to verify the unit price 
than to verify the quantity of materials used, so one might expect corruption to occur by inflating 
quantities rather than prices. To investigate this, in Table 4, I decompose the results into 
differences in prices and differences in quantities. Column (1) shows that even in control 
villages, there is almost no difference between reported and actual prices, and that all the 
unaccounted-for expenditures were due to differences between reported and actual quantities.
21 
Consistent with there being no mark-ups of prices to begin with, Columns (3) – (8) show that all 
of the reductions in missing expenditures caused by the audits were on the quantity dimension.  
An important question is whether the observed effects of the audits actually represent a 
reduction in corruption per se, or whether incompetent builders are simply being replaced by 
more skilled builders in response to the audits. To investigate this, I examined a number of 
quality measures, such as compactness of the road, the size and shape of the rocks, and the grade 
of the road, all of which are relatively inexpensive. Overall competence at construction should 
affect both expensive and inexpensive components, whereas a reduction in corruption would 
affect only the expensive aspects of construction quality (i.e. the volume of materials). In fact, I 
find that controlling for these inexpensive quality measures, either individually or aggregated 
                                                 
21 This difference is statistically significant – a t-test in control villages rejects the equality of differences in prices 
and differences in quantities with a p-value of less than 0.01. 
  22into an index, does not change the corruption results presented above.
22 This suggests that the 
results are actually being driven a reduction in corruption per se, rather than an overall change in 
the competence of those building the project.  
5.2.2.  Interactions with Village Politics 
An important question is the degree to which the monitoring probability and the 
punishment level are complements or substitutes.
23 In this context, one important part of the 
threat posed by an audit is that the village head might lose his re-election bid if corruption was 
exposed.
24 This may be particularly true for those village heads for whom the previous election 
for village head was close, and therefore for whom a small change in the vote would be more 
likely to result in defeat. One can therefore examine whether village heads facing a tough 
upcoming re-election battle respond more or less to audits, as a way of examining the interaction 
between the monitoring probability and the expected punishment.  
To examine this, I define a village as having an upcoming election for village head if the 
next such election is scheduled within two years of time of the first audits. I define a narrow 
victory in the last election as the difference between the runner-up’s vote share and the victor’s 
vote share in the previous village head election, so that higher (i.e. less negative) numbers 
indicate a closer election. I then re-estimate equation (1), including these variables and the 
interaction of these variables with the audit treatment, where the dependent variable is the 
percent missing in the road project. 
                                                 
22 Alternatively, putting an index of these variables on the left-hand side of equation (1) shows that there is no 
change in these inexpensive quality measures in response to the audits. 
23 It is worth noting that the sign of the second derivative of corruption with respect to the auditing probability and 
the punishment is theoretically ambiguous. See Di Tella and Shargrodsky (2003) for a model that makes this point.  
24 As discussed above, criminal corruption proceedings are becoming more common in Indonesia, but prosecutions 
against village-level officials, however, remain rare. (Woodhouse et. al, 2004) Electoral and social sanctions against 
village-levels are therefore likely to be a substantial portion of the threat created by audits. 
  23The results are presented in Table 5. The results suggest that the audits have a 
substantially larger effect – reducing the percent missing by 31 percentage points – in villages 
with an upcoming election. When I include the triple-interaction of audits, an upcoming election, 
and a narrow victory, I find that the effect of the audits is most pronounced for village heads who 
are up for re-election and whose last election was close – i.e., the village heads who presumably 
would find face the largest effective punishment for corruption being detected. In results not 
reported, I find that the effect disappears if the election is more than 2 years away, which 
suggests that the electorate is relatively myopic. Together, these results suggest that the audits 
had a greater effect when the punishment from being detected was greater, and that auditing and 
punishments – and specifically, punishments through democratic accountability – may be 
complements. 
5.2.3.  Employment of family members 
The BPKP auditors examined the project’s financial records and inspected the 
construction site. They did not, however, examine who worked on the project, and whether those 
who worked had family ties to the officials running the project. To the extent that giving jobs to 
family members is an alternative, but less desirable, method of extracting rents from the project, 
we might expect this type of non-audited behavior to respond to the increased audits. Of course, 
there are other reasons to hire family members besides rent-extraction; for example, work on the 
project by family members might increase if project officials facing audits wanted to improve the 
project and if family members are less prone to moral hazard or have higher skill than non family 
members. 
I examine the change in employment by family members using data from the household 
survey described in more detail in Appendix A. Each respondent in the household survey was 
  24asked if he or she was related to any of seven types of village government members or the head 
of the project implementation team. Overall, approximately 30 percent of respondents are related 
to some member of the village government, and 6 percent of respondents are related to the head 
of the project. I examine whether people who said that they were either immediate or extended 
family members of village government were more or less likely to report having worked for pay 
on the road project in audited villages than in control villages. Specifically, I estimate the 
following linear probability model using OLS:
25  
WORKEDhijk = γk + γ2 AUDITjk + γ3 FAMILYhijk + γ4 AUDIT × FAMILYijk  
+ γ5 Xhijk +  εhijk  (2) 
where FAMILY is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual was a family member of village 
government or the head of the project, WORKED is a dummy equal to 1 if a household member 
worked for pay on the project, X is a vector of control variables (age and gender of respondent, 
predicted household income, dummies for the ways the household was sampled, and the number 
of social activities household members participated in during the previous three months), h 
represents the household, i the village, j the subdistrict, k represents the audit stratum, and γk is a 
stratum fixed effect. The coefficient of interest is γ4, which represents the differential probability 
in audited villages relative to control villages that family members of village government or the 
head of the project worked on the project. The empirical results include two different FAMILY 
variables, one for being a family member of a government official and one for being a family 
member of the project head.  
The results are reported in Table 6. Column (1) shows that family members of 
government members are 8 percentage points more likely to work on the project in audited 
                                                 
25 Regressions using a Probit specification produce essentially similar results. 
  25villages than in control villages, and column (2) shows that family members of the project head 
are 14 percentage points more likely to work on the project in audited villages than in non-
audited villages. Given that the mean probability of working on the project is only 30 percent, 
these effects are quite large in magnitude.
26
As discussed above, there are different interpretations for these results – one view says 
that this is alternative, less desirable form of corruption, whereas the other suggests this is 
actually an attempt to improve the project. Though distinguishing between these alternative 
hypotheses is difficult, there is some suggestive evidence in favor of the nepotism-as-corruption 
view. In particular, the micro-finance literature has suggested that social connections can be an 
effective mechanism for minimizing moral hazard (Karlan 2004), so if reducing moral hazard 
was the issue, one might expect similar effects for workers with many social connections as for 
family members. In column (3) of Table 6, however, I find that while workers with many social 
connections are more likely to work on the project overall, there is no statistically significant 
differential effect in response to the audits in the relationship between social connections and 
working on the project. Column (4) shows that family member results are still present when I 
examine all the interactions jointly. Furthermore, in results not reported here, I find that, 
conditional on observables, family members of village officials are more likely to be employed 
in the higher wage category (skilled labor rather than unskilled), suggesting that they may be 
receiving rents from the project. While this evidence is suggestive of a nepotism-as-corruption 
story, it is by no means definitive, and understanding this phenomenon is an important direction 
for future work. 
                                                 
26 In results not reported, I find that there were no statistically significant changes in family members working on the 
project associated with the invitations treatments. For the comment forms treatment, there was a statistically 
significant increase in family members working on the project, but only for family members of the project head. 
  265.3.  The Participation Experiments 
5.3.1.  Did the interventions increase participation?  
Before we can assess the impact of increased participation on corruption, it is important 
to make sure that the treatments —i.e., the invitations and comment forms – did, in fact, increase 
villager participation. To examine this, in Table 7 I re-estimate equation (1), where the 
dependent variables are several measures of participation in the accountability process. Each 
observation represents one accountability meeting, so there are three observations for each 
village. Standard errors are adjusted to take into account this intra-village correlation. 
Column (1) shows that the treatments had a substantial effect on total attendance – the 
invitations treatment increased attendance at the meetings by an average of 14.8 people, or 
approximately 40 percent.
27 The slightly smaller increase for villages receiving comment forms 
as well as invitations suggests that being able to submit written comments and attending 
meetings are substitutes. Column (2) shows that virtually all of the increase in attendance at the 
meetings came in the form of increased attendance by these non-elite villagers, so that the 
number of non-elite at the meetings increased by 75 percent, from 16 people in the control 
villages to 26 people in the treatment villages.
28  
Columns (3) and (4) examine the impact of the treatments on active participation at the 
meetings. Column (3) shows that, in the invitations treatment, the average number of people who 
spoke at a meeting increased by 0.74, or just under 10 percent. Column (4) shows that about 40 
percent of these new speakers were non-elite, increasing the number of non-elite villagers who 
spoke at a meeting by about 30 percent over the baseline level. 
                                                 
27 Villages receiving 500 invitations had slightly higher attendance (by 1.7 people on average) than villages 
receiving 300, though these differences are not statistically significant. Passing out invitations through schools did 
not result in a statistically significant difference in composition of attendees. I therefore omit these additional sub-
variants in the subsequent analysis, though including them does not substantially alter the results. 
28 I classify people as “non-elite” if they have no official position in the village, no official position on the project, 
and were not described as a tokoh masyarakat (“informal village leader”) by village members who assisted the 
enumerator.  
  27In addition, the comment forms appear to have been quite successful in eliciting 
villagers’ opinions about the project. On average, 140 comment forms (about 35 percent) were 
returned, filled out, per meeting. The responses were quite varied, and on average had slightly 
more positive than negative comments. There are no substantial differences in the response rate 
across villages of differing average education levels—mean adult education in these villages is 
4.8 years, and 89 percent of adults can read and write—which suggests that, at least within the 
level of education in rural Java, education does not seem to be a substantial constraint to using 
comment forms to elicit villager responses. 
5.3.2.  Effect on Meetings 
Table 8 investigates the effect that increased participation (via the invitations and 
comment forms) had on the accountability meetings. As discussed in more detail in Appendix A, 
the enumerator recorded each problem or issue that was discussed at the meeting, and coded 
whether the problem was potentially corruption-related or not.
29 In addition, I define a ‘serious 
response’ to a problem as any of the serious actions that could be taken by a village in response 
to a problem with the project – specifically, agreeing to replace a supplier or village official, 
agreeing that money should be returned, agreeing for an internal village investigation, asking for 
help from district project officials, or requesting an external audit. These serious actions are quite 
rare – they occur at only 3 percent of meetings – and thus, to preserve statistical power, I 
consider them together. 
The results in Column (1) suggest that neither the invitations treatment nor the invitations 
+ comment form treatment had a significant effect on the total number of problems discussed at 
                                                 
29 Classifying problems and listing whether they are potentially corruption related clearly requires some degree of 
subjective judgment on the part of the enumerator filling out the form. However, all villages in a subdistrict were 
handled by the same enumerator, so including stratum (i.e., subdistrict) fixed effects controls for these potential 
differences in coding. 
  28the meeting. This implies that the increase in the number of people talking in Table 7 is an 
increase in who participates in the discussion, not an increase in the number of problems per se.  
However, as shown in Column (2), both the invitations and the invitations + comment forms 
increased the probability of having a corruption-related problem discussed at the meeting by 2.7 
percentage points, or 50 percent above the baseline level. Only the comment forms, however, 
affected how problems were resolved – column (3) shows that the probability of a serious action 
being taken is 1.5 percentage points higher – or 70 percent higher than the baseline amount – in 
villages receiving the comment forms, but that there is no effect in villages receiving only 
invitations.  
These results suggest that the impact of the comment forms was slightly different from 
what was expected. In particular, despite the large number of comments received, adding the 
comment forms did not change the probability that a corruption-related problem was discussed. 
This does not mean that fear of retaliation was not an issue, however. Rather, the results suggest 
that when an issue was brought up, possibly by an elite member of the village who had less fear 
of retaliation by the implementation team, villagers may have been unsure whether to side with 
the challenger or the implementation team. Knowing from the comment forms that many other 
people agreed with them, and therefore that the challenge was likely to be victorious, may have 
tipped the balance. This suggests the comment forms were more about creating common 
knowledge about problem, rather than bringing previously unknown problems to light. 
Nevertheless, both of these effects were small in absolute magnitude. 
5.3.3.  Effect on Missing Expenditures 
Table 9 examines the overall impact of the two participation treatments on the percent 
missing in the projects. The first panel shows the effect of the invitations treatment; the second 
  29panel shows the effect of the invitations + comment forms treatment. The results suggest that 
both the invitations and invitations + comment forms treatments had a small, and statistically 
insignificant, impact on the overall percent missing from the project. Depending on the 
specification and the measure of corruption, the point estimates suggest that these treatments 
reduced the percent missing by between 1.5 and 3 percentage points, though these estimates are 
never statistically distinguishable from 0.  
The lack of a strong effect of the invitations and comment forms on corruption is 
consistent with the evidence in Section 5.3.2, for while the comment forms did increase the 
probability of serious action being taken in response to corruption, the magnitude of this 
response was small. In fact, even if taking a serious anti-corruption action at a meeting 
eliminated corruption entirely, the reduction in corruption in caused by these induced serious 
actions would have been less than 1 percentage point of average total expenditures.
30 The results 
here suggest that not only were the direct effects (via anti-corruption actions) small, but any 
deterrent effects of the treatments were small as well.  
However, the small effects on the overall percent missing variable mask the fact that 
there were substantial reductions in missing labor expenditures. As shown in Table 9, the 
invitations treatment led to a statistically significant reduction in missing expenditures in labor of 
between 14 percentage and 18 percentage points. The invitations + comment forms also led to a 
reduction in missing labor expenditures, though it was somewhat smaller in magnitude (9 to 13 
                                                 
30 To see this, suppose that taking a serious anti-corruption action eliminates corruption in the village. (In fact, in the 
cross-section, villages where a serious response was taken had a missing expenditures about 18 percentage points 
lower than other villages.) If I re-estimate Table 8 at the village level, rather than the meeting level, the point-
estimate is that comment forms treatment increased the probability of a serious response to a problem by 3.8 
percentage points. This suggests that, if the sole effect of the comment forms was through the probability of a 
serious response being taken, the expected average reduction in the percent missing would be 18 × 0.038 = 0.68 
percentage points.  
  30percentage points) and not statistically significant.
31 On the other hand, the point estimates 
suggest no change, or if anything a very mild increase, in missing funds on the materials 
dimension. Since, as shown in Table 2, materials account for 68% of road expenditures whereas 
unskilled labor accounts for only 20%, the lack of an effect on the materials dimension is why 
the effects on the overall percent missing are small and statistically insignificant despite the 
reduction in missing labor. 
There are several different potential explanations for the reduction in labor expenditures 
but not materials associated with the participation treatments. First, it may be easier for villagers 
to observe actual wage payments than the quantity of materials delivered, making corruption in 
labor technologically easier for villagers to detect. Alternatively, even if villagers had equal 
information about both types of corruption, the focus on labor may have arisen because the 
invitations induced more workers to attend the meetings, and those workers focused on their 
private interest (i.e., the wages they personally were supposed to be paid by the project) rather 
than the public good of a higher quality road.  
Though these hypotheses are difficult to definitively distinguish, there is suggestive 
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that it was more about incentives than information. First, the 
household survey described in Appendix A included a question on the respondent’s perceptions 
of corruption in the road project. In related work (Olken 2005), I find that these perceptions of 
corruption in the project were positively correlated with missing materials expenditures, but were 
uncorrelated with missing labor expenditures. This suggests that, surprisingly, villagers appear to 
have more information about missing materials expenditures, not missing labor expenditures. 
                                                 
31 I cannot reject the hypothesis that the two participation treatments (invitations and invitations + comment forms) 
had the same effect. Pooling them together yields an average reduction in labor expenditures of between 12 and 17 
percentage points, with the average reduction statistically significant in 2 of 3 specifications. 
  31Second, one can examine whether the invitations treatment varies when workers come 
from outside the village, and are therefore ineligible to attend the accountability meetings. When 
I do this (i.e., interact the invitations treatment with the percent of workers coming from outside 
the village), I find that the reduction in missing labor associated with the invitations treatment is 
smaller when more of the workers come from outside the village. Since the only people that 
attend the accountability meetings are those who live in the village, this suggests that it is the fact 
that the invitations induce workers to attend meetings and fight for their own wages that drives 
the reduction in theft in wages. The percent of workers coming from outside the village is 
potentially endogenous, so these results should be viewed as speculative. Nevertheless, this 
result, combined with the result about information, suggests that the lack of a reduction in 
materials may be because monitoring theft of materials is more of a public good than monitoring 
theft of wages. 
Even without the invitations and comment forms, the KDP program investigated here 
includes more grass-roots participation, and a more complicated system of checks and balances, 
than the typical government project in most developing countries. It is possible that the marginal 
effects of increasing participation from this relatively high baseline—i.e., the effects reported 
above—do not capture the overall effects of grass-roots participation as a monitoring 
mechanism, and that more dramatic variations in the amount of participation might have 
different effects. However, the fact that the invitations did lead to a substantial reduction in 
missing labor expenditures suggests that the changes in participation induced by the 
interventions were large enough to make a difference. 
  326.  Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The previous analysis discussed the direct effects of the treatments. This section performs 
a cost-benefit calculation to assess whether, on net, the benefits from these treatments exceed the 
costs. This exercise requires making several assumptions, particularly about the efficiency cost 
of different types of missing expenditures, and therefore should be viewed as somewhat more 
speculative than the preceding sections.   
Table 10 presents the cost-benefit estimates for the audits and invitations treatments. 
(Since none of the estimated effects of invitations + comment forms were statistically significant, 
I omit them from this analysis.) For each treatment, I present two sets of net benefits – “equally 
weighted net benefits,” calculated under the assumption that the marginal utility of income is 
constant across individuals, and “distribution weighted net benefits,” which takes into account 
the fact that some benefits and costs are borne by the rich while others are borne by the poor.
32  
The net benefits are derived as follows. First, the monetary cost of the audits is the actual 
cost paid by the project per audit, including the salary of the auditors, and the monetary cost of 
the invitations is the actual cost paid for photocopying the invitations. The associated dead-
weight loss is the dead-weight loss associated with the increased taxes required to pay the 
monetary cost of the treatments.
33 Finally, the time cost for both treatments is the monetary value 
                                                 
32 Specifically, the distribution-weighted net benefits assumes CRRA utility of per-capita consumption with a 
coefficient of relative-risk aversion of 2, normalized so that the median household in rural Java has marginal utility 
of 1. Households where someone is in the village government have per-capita expenditure 18.5 percent higher than 
typical households in the village, so this (plus the CRRA assumptions) suggests that the social value of $1 of rents 
received by project or government officials is $0.61. On the other hand, the social value of $1 of increased wages 
received by workers is $1.29, as workers have per-capita consumption approximately 13 percent lower than the 
median in the village. I assume that the social benefits from the road are enjoyed equally by all in the village, so they 
have a marginal social value of 1. Finally, for taxes, I estimate the distributional impact of both the monetary and 
deadweight loss cost using national consumption data from the 2003 SUSENAS, assuming that the burden is borne 
proportionally to consumption. 
33 Estimates of the marginal cost of public funds for indirect taxes vary considerably. For developing countries, 
estimates for the marginal cost of funds from indirect taxes range from 1.04 to 1.05 in Indonesia and Bangladesh 
(Devarajan et. al, 1999) to 1.59 to 2.15 for India (Ahmad and Stern, 1987). By comparison, estimates of the 
marginal cost of public funds for the U.S. range from 1.17 to 1.56 (Ballard et. al, 1985), with policy analysis 
  33of the additional time villagers spend at village meetings as a result of the treatments, valued at 
average local wage rates. 
The estimates for the change in rents received by corrupt officials are taken from Column 
(3) in Table 3 and Table 9, multiplied by the average cost of the project and the average percent 
of the project consisting of materials and labor expenditures from Table 2. To estimate the 
change in benefits from the project, I use the point estimates of the change in actual expenditures 
relative to the original (pre-randomization) plan.
34 For wages, the increase in actual wage 
expenditures is valued at the actual amount transferred. For materials, the increase in materials 
expenditure increases the lifespan of the road. To value the change in lifespan of the road, I use 
estimates from a cost-benefit evaluation of KDP roads conducted for the World Bank (Dent 
2001), which imply that the marginal dollar of materials stolen reduces the discounted benefits 
from the road by 3.41 dollars.
35 For other reported expenditures, I assume a marginal social 
value of 1, since it is unclear what percentage of them are actually spent productively on the road 
as opposed to being captured by local officials. 
The results presented in Table 10 suggest that the audits were substantially cost-effective. 
I estimate that the net social benefits from the audits were approximately $250 per village, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
typically using values in the range from 1.30 to 1.40. I assume that the marginal cost of public funds is 1.4 (i.e. the 
dead-weight loss is 0.4) 
34 The reason to use the change in actual expenditures relative to the original plan, rather than missing expenditures 
in each category, is that there may have been changes in where corruption was hidden in the accounting ledgers, and 
such nominal changes in reporting would have no efficiency consequences. For example, in results not reported in 
the table, I find that the reduction in missing labor expenditures was due to a combination of shifting reported 
expenditures – there is a reduction in reported labor expenditures and a corresponding increase in reported other 
expenditures (i.e., the 12% of expenditures on things other than rocks, sand, gravel, and unskilled labor) – as well as 
a real increase in actual wage payments to workers, though these changes are not statistically significant. The 
changes in missing expenditures due to the audits, however, all show up as increases in actual expenditures. 
35 Dent estimates that KDP road projects produces annual flow benefits of 33% of their cost each year for the life of 
the road. He also estimates that a good quality road will last 10 years and a poor quality road will last 5 years. Based 
on conversations with KDP engineers, I assume that each percentage of materials stolen reduces the life of the road 
by 0.1 years, so stealing 50% of materials is the difference between ‘good’ and ‘poor’ quality. Assuming a real 
discount rate of 5% and that the baseline lifespan of a road is 7 years implies that each dollar of materials stolen 
reduces the discounted net benefits of the project by 3.41 dollars. 
  34implies that the benefits were more than 150% the cost of the audits. Weighting by distributional 
incidence increases these net benefits even more. For the invitations treatment, I estimate net 
benefits that are close to zero, since a reduction in theft of labor is just a transfer from wealthy 
village leaders to ordinary workers.  
The audit treatment discussed here was a move from a 4% baseline audit probability to a 
100% audit probability. It is possible, however, that the response of corruption to the audit 
probability is concave, so that an audit probability of only 50% or even 25% might achieve most 
of the benefits.
36 The costs of audits, however, are roughly linear in the audit probability. This 
suggests that raising audit probabilities to an intermediate level, rather than all the way to 100%, 
might have an even higher cost-benefit ratio than the 100% audit probability documented here.  
7.  Conclusion 
This paper has examined the results of a field experiment in Indonesia, designed to 
investigate alternative approaches to fighting corruption. I examined the effect of two strategies: 
top-down monitoring by government auditors, and bottom-up monitoring through grass-roots 
participation in the village monitoring process. The evidence suggests that increasing the 
probability of external audits substantially reduced missing funds in the project. A cost benefit 
analysis suggests that the benefits from the audits exceeded their cost.  
By contrast, increasing grass-roots participation in monitoring the project affected only 
missing labor expenditures, with no impact on materials and, as a consequence, little impact 
overall. These results suggest that grass-roots monitoring may be more effective for government 
programs that provide private goods, such as subsidized food, education or medical care, where 
individual citizens have a personal stake in ensuring that the goods are delivered and that theft is 
                                                 
36 For example, Nagin. et al. (2002), in a study of monitoring of call center employees, found substantial evidence of 
diminishing returns to increasing the monitoring probability. 
  35minimized. For public goods where incentives to monitor are much weaker, such as the 
infrastructure projects studied here, the results suggest that using professional auditors may be 
much more effective.  
This does not mean that empowering community members to discipline service providers 
has no role in an anti-corruption approach. In fact, the results suggests that the audits were most 
effective when the village head was up for re-election, which suggests that local level 
accountability may be an important mechanism for disciplining public officials. However, the 
results suggest that grass-roots monitoring alone may not be sufficient, and that for detecting 
corruption professional monitors may also important. 
The results in this paper present the results from a short-run intervention. If auditors are 
bribable, over time villages may develop repeat relationships with auditors which may make 
bribing auditors easier than in the one-shot case examined here. This might suggest, for example, 
that frequent rotation of auditors – or lower probabilities of audits combined with higher 
punishments – may be optimal. Understanding the long-run implications of anti-corruption 
policies, and developing ways of ensuring that they remain effective over the long term, is an 
important issue for future research. 
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Appendix A  Data collection 
In addition to the corruption field survey described in Section 4 above, this paper uses 
three other types of data collected during the course of the project—key-informant surveys, data 
on village meetings, and a household survey. This Appendix describes the data on village 
meetings and the household survey. In addition, it provides additional details on the field survey 
described above. 
 
Village meeting data 
In each KDP year in a village, there are a total of seven regularly scheduled village 
meetings that must occur (including the three accountability meetings.) The enumerator was 
present at the final four meetings – the meeting at which preparations for construction were 
begun plus the three accountability meetings. At each meeting, the enumerator circulated an 
attendance list. As the meeting progressed, the enumerator (with the assistance of a local 
counterpart) noted on the attendance list each person who spoke at the meeting. In addition, 
sitting with the local counterpart after the meeting was over, the enumerator asked the local 
counterpart to identify which of the attendees was a tokoh masyarakat, or informal leader, a 
designation typically given to teachers, religious leaders, or other types of informal village 
leaders.  
While the meeting was in progress, the enumerator was asked to keep detailed notes on 
what occurred during the meeting. The enumerator compiled a list of all problems that arose at 
the meeting. A “problem” was defined as the topic of any substantial discussion other than the 
routine business of the meeting; the median problem reported in the data was discussed for 7 
minutes, and the mean number of problems reported in an Accountability Meeting was 0.73. For 
each problem, the enumerator described the problem, classified it according to one of 57 pre-
defined problem codes, and listed the amount of time spent discussing the problem, who first 
raised the problem, who was potentially involved in the problem, whether there were indications 
of corruption in the problem, whether the problem was resolved, and if so, what actions were 
taken to resolve it. 
 
Household survey 
The household survey was conducted approximately during the last two months of 
construction and the first month after construction was completed. The survey contained a 
household roster, a list of assets, information on participation in social, religious, and 
government activities, detailed information on participation in the road project, and a series of 
questions about perceptions of corruption. Household expenditures were predicted based on 
assets, using the relationship between assets and consumption from the 1999 SSD (Hundred 
Villages Survey). The household survey was designed as a stratified random sample, containing 
between six and thirteen respondents per village.  
 
Field survey / Corruption measurement 
  The general approach used in the field survey is described in Section 4 of the text above. 
This section discusses a number of additional aspects of the data collection not discussed above 
that are important for the analysis in this paper. 
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village reports, these contributions account for an average of 16% of total project costs. Of these 
voluntary contributions, the bulk (60% according to official village reports) comes in the form of 
either voluntary labor or tools (typically, village workers bring their own tools to work on the 
project; the value of these tools is often reported as a voluntary contribution). Anecdotal 
evidence confirms that voluntary contributions are qualitatively important primarily for labor and 
tools. 
  I treat these voluntary contributions as follows. For the three main materials in the road 
projects—sand, rocks, and gravel—I include both reported project expenditures and reported 
voluntary contributions when calculating the total amount of reported materials, as this total 
amount should be comparable to the total amount of each type of material observed in the field. 
For labor, where overstating voluntary labor is a much more important potential margin of 
corruption than in materials, a different approach was taken. As discussed in Section 4, for labor, 
I use only reports and actual estimates of paid labor, and exclude voluntary labor.  
  For the worker survey described in Section 4 above, a total of five worker interviews 
were conducted in each village. Of these interviews, two were focus group interviews, consisting 
of 3 or more workers interviewed together, and three were individual interviews. Two of these 
interviews (one focus group, one individual) were workers randomly selected form the official 
list of all workers who had ever been paid by the project; the remainder were recruited more 
informally, by having the surveyor go to different areas of the village located near the road and 
asking households who had worked on the project. 
  The responses on the worker survey are in some cases quite variable. In particular, there 
is often variation because certain workers only worked on certain aspects of the project, because 
certain parts of the project were done differently than others, or because some workers were 
confused about the meaning of the questions. Because these discrepancies can be quite difficult 
to capture on the survey, surveyors were asked to fill out a form in which they summarized the 
results of all interviews. The surveyors were instructed that the summary should represent their 
best understanding of what actually happened in the village, based only on the information in the 
worker surveys. Though this summary is necessarily more subjective than answers to the worker 
surveys, experience during the pilots suggests that this method is more accurate than using 
mechanical averages from the individual worker surveys. Accordingly, the main results use the 
information from this summary report. 
Appendix B  Assumptions and Calibration 
Two main types of assumptions are used in the corruption calculations in this paper—
assumptions about loss ratios, defined as the percentage of materials unaccounted for as a result 
of normal construction losses and measurement error, and assumptions about worker capacity, 
defined as the amount of each type of task an average worker can accomplish in a day of work. 
This section describes the assumptions used in the paper in more details, and discusses the 
calibration exercises through which these assumptions were determined. 
To determine the appropriate assumptions, two methods were used. First, similar 
assumptions are used in the planning process for KDP roads. For example, KDP engineers 
typically assume normal construction losses of 16 percent for sand and gravel, and 23 percent for 
rock. Therefore, when purchasing supplies, engineers increase the final volume of materials they 
need by these amounts to ensure the appropriate quantities at the time of construction. Similarly, 
when budgeting labor requirements, KDP engineers estimate the quantities of each type of task 
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obtained, from the KDP chief engineer, the standard assumptions typically used for KDP 
projects.  
There are several problems with these assumptions, however. For the loss ratios for 
physical materials, the estimates included only the losses during the construction process; they 
do not include the additional losses inherent in the measurement process. They are therefore 
likely to be too small for the purposes here. For manual labor, the estimates used were apparently 
based on a 1970s workfare program, when both worker nourishment and worker motivation were 
substantially lower than today.  
Given this, I conducted 4 calibration exercises. In each calibration exercise, our project 
built a 60 meter Telford road, similar in construction techniques and standards to KDP road 
projects. Materials were purchased from local suppliers, and labor was recruited from the 
villages in which the roads were constructed. The roads were constructed in four very different 
regions of the study area, which were chosen to represent the different types of conditions typical 
in the study area. Detailed measurements were taken of all materials delivered to the site, and 
careful track was kept of each worker’s activities during construction.  
Once the road was completed, the measurement techniques from the study were applied 
to the test road. Using these techniques, I estimated the total quantity of material used in each 
road. By comparing the quantity of material estimated using the study techniques to the actual 
quantity of material we used in the road (which is known, since it was measured as it arrived at 
the project site), one can recover the correct loss ratios.  
From the logs of worker activity, I was able to construct the actual time required by the 
workers on these test roads to complete each of the tasks assigned to them. Of course, workers 
who know that they are being closely watched may work more quickly than normal workers in 
the field. Nevertheless, the pace of work in the test road was between 50 and 700 percent faster, 
depending on the task, than the standard assumptions. Additional conversations with field 
engineers confirmed that the 1970s standards were, in fact, quite low. As one engineer said, the 
standards were so loose that “if a project using those standards didn’t finish with money left 
over, I was immediately suspicious that there was corruption in that village.” 
Table 11 lists the main assumptions used in the study, based on the results of the 
calibration. For the labor estimates, the revised estimates were revised downward 20% from the 
estimates from the test road, to incorporate breaks taken by workers and to take into account the 
fact that carefully watched workers may work faster than workers under more normal monitoring 
conditions.  
Interestingly, the high loss ratio for gravel and low loss ratio for sand suggests that some 
of the gravel is seeping through cracks in the rocks, and is counted by our survey as sand. This 
suggests that one might better consider “sand + gravel” together (with an implied joint loss ratio 
of 1.25), rather than separately. Doing so reduces the average percent missing from 23 percent to 
21 percent, but otherwise does not alter the results of the paper.  
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Table 1: Number of villages in each treatment category 
 Control  Invitations  Invitations  + 
Comment Forms 
Total 
Control  114 105 106 325   
Audit  93 94 96 283   
Total  207 199 202 608 
Notes: Tabulations from results of randomization. Each subdistrict faced a 48% chance of being randomized into the Audit treatment. Each 
village faced a 33% chance of being randomized into the Invitations treatment, and a 33% chance of being randomized into the Invitations + 








Table 2: Summary Statistics 
  
Total project size (US$)          8,875  
         (4,401) 
  
Share of total reported expenses   
Road project          0.766  
         (0.230) 
Ancillary projects           0.154  
(culverts, retaining walls, etc)         (0.181) 
Other projects          0.079  
(schools, bridges, irrigation, etc)         (0.166) 
  
Share of reported road expenses   
Sand          0.099  
         (0.080) 
Rocks          0.484  
         (0.143) 
Gravel          0.116  
         (0.181) 
Unskilled labor          0.196  
         (0.125) 
Other          0.105  
         (0.164) 
  
Number observations  538 
Notes: Statistics shown are means, with standard deviations in parentheses. 
Data for the 538 villages for which percent missing could be calculated. 
Exchange rate: Rp. 9,000 = US $1. 
 Table 3: Audits – main theft results     
 








Log reported value – 

















             
Major items in roads  0.277  0.192  -0.085  0.058  -0.076  0.041  -0.048  0.144  477 
  (0.033)  (0.029)  (0.044)  (0.037)  (0.033)    
Major items in roads  0.291  0.199  -0.091  0.034  -0.086  0.023  -0.090  0.012  538 
and  ancillary  projects  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.043)  (0.038)  (0.036)    
              
Breakdown  of  roads:             
Materials  0.240  0.162  -0.078 0.143 -0.063 0.141 -0.034 0.398  477 
  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.053)  (0.042)  (0.040)    
Unskilled  labor  0.312  0.231  -0.077 0.477 -0.090 0.310 -0.041 0.590  426 
  (0.080)  (0.072)  (0.108)  (0.088)  (0.076)    
             
Notes: Audit effect, standard errors, and p-values are computed by estimating equation (1), a regression of the dependent variable on a dummy 
for audit treatment, invitations treatment and invitations + comment forms treatments. Robust standard errors in parentheses, allowing for 
clustering by subdistrict (to account for clustering of treatment by subdistrict). Each ‘audit effect’, standard error, and accompanying p-value is 
from a separate regression. Each row shows a different dependent variable, shown at left. All dependent variables are the log of the value 
reported by the village less the log of the estimated actual value, which is approximately equal to the percent missing. Villages are included in 




Table 4: Audits – prices vs. quantities     
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Prices  -0.018  -0.016  0.002 0.949 0.011 0.666 0.018 0.458 494 
  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.024)    
              
Quantities  0.276  0.207  -0.069 0.092 -0.069 0.053 -0.048 0.141  477 
  (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.041)  (0.035)  (0.032)    
              
Notes: See Notes to Table 3. Reported and actual prices are defined as a weighted average across different commodities (rock, sand, gravel, and 
unskilled labor), where each commodity is weighted by the reported quantity. Reported and actual quantities are also defined as a weighted 
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Table 5: Interactions with village politics 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Upcoming  election  0.144 0.026 0.219 
  (0.111) (0.092) (0.167) 
Narrow victory  0.092*  0.049  0.024 
  (0.052) (0.064) (0.062) 
Audit -0.060*  -0.039  -0.008 
  (0.033) (0.049) (0.047) 
Upcoming election * Audit  -0.306*    -0.668** 
 (0.176)    (0.268) 
Narrow victory * Audit    0.112  0.159 
   (0.100)  (0.102) 
Narrow victory *       0.187 
Upcoming election      (0.218) 
Narrow victory *       -0.878** 
Upcoming election * Audit      (0.428) 
Stratum  fixed  effects  YES YES YES 
Observations  428 428 428 
R-squared  0.38 0.37 0.39 
Mean dep. var  0.24  0.24  0.24 
Notes: Results from estimating equation (1), with additional interactions between the audit 
variable and the village-level characteristics shown in the table. Dependent variable is missing 
expenditures in the road project. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, adjusted for clustering 
at the subdistrict level. Upcoming election is a dummy variable for whether the village head 
election is scheduled within the next 2 years. Narrow victory is defined as the difference 
between the vote share of the second place candidate and the winning candidate in the most 
recent village head election, so that larger (i.e., less negative) numbers indicate a closer 
election.  
 
Table 6: Nepotism 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Audit -0.011  0.004  -0.017  -0.038 
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.032) (0.032) 
Village Gov't Family   -0.020  0.016  0.016  -0.014 
Member  (0.024) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) 
Project Head Family   0.051  -0.015  0.051  -0.004 
Member  (0.032) (0.047) (0.032) (0.047) 
Social activities  0.017***  0.017***  0.013*  0.014** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Audit × Village Gov't   0.079**     0.064* 
Family Member  (0.034)      (0.034) 
Audit × Project Head    0.138**   0.115* 
Family  Member   (0.060)   (0.061) 
Audit × Social      0.010  0.008 
activities     (0.008)  (0.008) 
Stratum  Fixed  Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  3386 3386 3386 3386 
R-squared  0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 
Mean dep. variable  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.30 
Notes: Data is from the household survey. Each observation represents one household. Results from estimating 
equation (2), where the dependent variable is a dummy for whether a household member worked (for pay) on the 
road project. Estimation is by OLS with stratum fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for 
clustering at subdistrict level. Social activities refers to the number of social activities adult household members 
participated in during the last month. All specifications include controls for invitations and invitations + comment 
form treatments, age and gender of respondent, mean adult education in the household, predicted household income, 
and dummies for type of household sampled.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
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Table 7: Participation – First stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Attendance  Attendance  of 
Non-Elite 
Number Talk  Number Non-
Elite who Talk 
Invitations  14.83*** 13.47***  0.743*** 0.286*** 
 (1.42)  (1.31)  (0.196)  (0.082) 
Invitations + Comment  11.48***  10.28***  0.498***  0.221*** 
 (1.41)  (1.33)  (0.174)  (0.072) 
Meeting #2  -5.32***  -4.00***  0.163  0.024 
 (1.16)  (1.11)  (0.162)  (0.088) 
Meeting  #3  -4.29*** -5.78***  0.431** -0.158* 
 (1.26)  (1.19)  (0.180)  (0.093) 
Stratum  Fixed  Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  1775 1775 1775 1775 
R-squared  0.39 0.38 0.47 0.28 
Mean dep. variable  47.99  24.15  8.02  0.94 
P-value Invitations = 
Invitations + Comment Forms 
0.04 0.04 0.23 0.45 
Notes: Results from estimating equation (1), with the dependent variables the participation variables shown in the first row. Data is from the 
meeting survey. Each observation is a single village meeting. Includes stratum (subdistrict) fixed effects; since audit is constant within substrict, 
the audit variable is automatically captured by the stratum fixed effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at village 
level.  




Table 8: Participation – Impact on Meetings  










Invitations 0.072  0.027**  -0.003 
 (0.066)  (0.013)  (0.008) 
Invitations + Comment  0.104  0.026**  0.015* 
 (0.067)  (0.013)  (0.008) 
Meeting #2  -0.187***  0.002  -0.020** 
 (0.069)  (0.013)  (0.010) 
Meeting #3  -0.428***  -0.036***  -0.029*** 
 (0.077)  (0.012)  (0.010) 
Stratum fixed effects  YES  YES  YES 
Observations 1783  1783  1783 
R-squared 0.50  0.31  0.22 
Mean dep. variable  1.18  0.07  0.03 
P-value Invitations = 
Invitations + Comment 
Forms 
0.62 0.96 0.02 
Notes: Results from estimating equation (1), with the dependent variables the outcome of meetings shown in the first-row. Data is from meeting 
survey. Each observation represents one village. “Serious response” is defined as agreeing to replace a supplier or village office, agreeing that 
money should be returned, agreeing for an internal village investigation, asking for help from district project officials, or requesting an external 
audit. Estimation is by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering by village.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 9: Participation -- Main theft results 
Panel A: Invitations 








Log reported value – 

















             
Major items in roads  0.252  0.230  -0.021  0.556  -0.030  0.391  -0.026  0.448  477 
  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.034)    
Major items in roads  0.268  0.236  -0.030  0.360  -0.032  0.324  -0.029  0.356  538 
and  ancillary  projects  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)    
              
Breakdown  of  roads:              
Materials  0.209  0.221  0.014 0.725 0.008 0.841 0.005 0.882 477 
  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.037)    
Unskilled  labor  0.369  0.180  -0.187 0.058 -0.215 0.026 -0.143 0.098  426 
  (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.098)  (0.095)  (0.086)    
              
 
 
Panel B: Invitations + Comments 








Log reported value – 
























             
Major items in roads  0.252  0.228  -0.022  0.455  -0.024  0.416  -0.015  0.601  477 
  (0.033)  (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.030)    
Major items in roads  0.268  0.238  -0.026  0.409  -0.025  0.411  -0.027  0.385  538 
and  ancillary  projects  (0.031)  (0.026)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.031)    
              
Breakdown  of  roads:              
Materials  0.209  0.180  -0.028 0.414 -0.022 0.501 -0.010 0.754  477 
  (0.041)  (0.032)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.033)    
Unskilled  labor  0.369  0.267  -0.099 0.255 -0.132 0.136 -0.090 0.323  426 
  (0.077)  (0.073)  (0.087)  (0.088)  (0.091)    
              
Notes: See Notes to Table 3. Results from estimating equation (1), a regression of the dependent variable on a dummy for audit treatment, 
invitations treatment and invitations + comment forms treatments. Each ‘invitations effect’ and ‘invitations + comment effect’ is from a separate 
regression, with the dependent variable listed in the row and the fixed effects specification listed in the column heading. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. Regressions without stratum (i.e., subdistrict) fixed effects include a variable for audits, and allow for clustering of standard 
errors by subdistrict.  
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Table 10: Net benefits calculation 
        













Net Benefits   
Cost of treatment:             
Monetary cost  -335  -278    -13  -11   
Associated dead-weight loss -134  -111    -5  -4   
Time cost  -31  -31    -27  -27   
Subtotal  -500 -419    -46  -43   
            
Change in rents received by corrupt officials:             
From theft of materials  -367  -224    62  38   
From theft of wages  -102  -62    -254  -155   
Subtotal -468  -286    -191  -117   
            
Change in benefits from project:             
NPV value of road expenditures  1165  1165    30  30   
Wages received by workers  86  111   93  120   
Other expenditures  -37  -37   73  73   
Subtotal 1213  1238   196  223   
           
TOTAL NET BENEFITS  245  533   -41  64   
           
Note: All figures in USD. Costs are listed as negative numbers. Distributional weights calculated using CRRA utility with coefficient of 
relative-risk aversion of 2. Derivation of change in NPV value of road and additional assumptions are discussed in the text.  
 
 
Table 11: Assumptions for loss ratios and worker capacity 
 
   Results from 
Calibration 





Worker Capacity   
Clearing brush and cleaning road surface (m2)  20 
Spreading sand (m3)  4.5 
Splitting rocks (m3)  3.0 
Installing rock layer (m2)   6.5 
Spreading gravel (m3)  2.25 
Digging side channels and creating shoulder 
(m3) 1.0 
Building retaining wall (m3) 
(unskilled labor portion)  0.33* 
Standard cut and fill(m3)  2* 
Notes: All loss ratios are expressed as the ratio of the original amount of material to the amount 
measured, and are for measurements loose, not compacted. Worker capacity is the quantity of the 
given activity that can be done by one person per 6 hours of work.  
* Original KDP assumption that was not able to be reconfirmed from calibration exercises. 
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